Alfatine 56352 Adam 78351

AJW

Bill Nov 10

K could not afford the humiliation of (turning his ship around) a second time).

Cuban reaction to Treat (letter)
S "

reason

✓ Instructions to Allen, 29 Oct (?)

✓ Bell memo to Pres, 10 Nov:

of SU bases

✓ Nolte memo of 3 Oct on types of missiles.

✓ SNIE of 18 Sept on Military Buildup in Cuba

(SU is probably mentioning also more likely than IRBMs, but still very unlikely; would upset US reactions; change in SU policy).

✓ Mondelstam memo of 9 Oct: trend toward introduction of IRBMs, probably subs.

✓ McN to Chiefs, 2 Oct: 6 contingencies.

✓ JCS comments, 15 Oct (?)

✓ J-5, 19 Oct

See: Kitter letter of 27 Oct to Pres? Black Saturday

Nitze instructions in Quadripartite group, sent to NAC 27 Oct

NAC minutes, 23 Oct

JCS comments on Rainwoot

Dept instructions to Finletter for NAC, Oct 27

Dean Lewis with Lewis, Stys

memo on numbers of aircraft etc. by Soviet party.

✓ ASW ✓

We actually bought us into a "position of strength" in strategic field (and maybe, either b. now JFK would have done its weight for wrong intelligence estimates; see Lippmann article, Hungary, JFK speech),

Get our expectation of coming "Munich" — plus unwillingness to prepare for it by increasing conventional arms (which were slowly too weak to permit initiative: as in Hungary, Berlin/Polish crisis, Nato) — kept him from exploiting strength or from developing a strategy of strength.

Instead, we have unwonted defensive, tied to a strategy of weakness; a desperate strategy (NSC 68) appropriate to, say, Troan versus Saints; a strategy of punishment which aims (cf. Kaulle) to "Tear an arm off" — though actually big enough to slaughter, if used "French-style" (WWII-style) (French didn't have strat. bombardment doctrine then) — or to disarm SU, considering actual & SU forces. (JSCS seem related to — wrong — estimates of future SU capability!)

weaken our deterrence of aggression etc. by third party.

ASW

Cuba shows importance of initiative capability; though problem of the "Metastasis of Conflict." (Bundy; Ball) more; fear of this Horizontal Escalation — when SU Vertical Escalation — can be a way of rationalizing inaction, or a concealed fear of any risk whatever (of either sort of escalation).

Only adequate conventional forces permit us to probe, to counter SU moves with threat elsewhere, to cast back or limited SU moves (e.g., Berlin), to assist result — without risking defeats inescapably disastrous. Superiority is not needed for these purposes; rapid then limited moves, challenge them to raise stakes.

Cuba shows that our nuclear superiority does not deter them from [aside from limited aggression: McN] highly provocative probe of our position (looking for weakness, which it may find?!), attempt to demonstrate unopposed weakness, desertion or disunity, to humiliate us or split Allies or weaken our interests of aggression etc. by third party.

may, very [illegible]

AJW

[illegible]

We must be prepared to act fast and decisively, in informal way (under Eisen.) — to Jerrold Schecter — to make sure that they learn from their experiment what we want them to learn, including costs & risks of such tests.

Also, we want ability to teach allies (& US public; and ...): e.g. to rely on US, not to fear SU probes, strength of position & unity, etc. etc. rather than to learn directions lessons [even if SU learns wrong lessons, it can try to reverse lessons by preventing US Allies from learning right ones — especially if US cooperates in SU noise]. Ideally, SU may wish (or, does not know how) to teach their leaders & leaderlike Allies what we want them to learn: which K seems to be doing! (Dec 13)

Among contingencies to be planned for (i.e. against): certain likely, dangerous proposals or moves within the Administration during a crisis; anticipate these, prepare argument against, counter-proposals. To what positions/attitudes do we want US/NATO committed?

Study:

1) Inflation of gold outflow.

2) Impact of Defense Budget.

3) Programing, Procurement practices, Costing; Budget Process

4) R+D Policy

5) Stockpile, mobilization reserves / in Controlled War / LW / Post-other recuperant

6) Systems Analysis + Strategic Choice

7) C+C in Controlled Response

Crises

Limited War

Problem common to Strat Intelligence, R+D Warning, Operational Choice,

8) Organization for Operations, Plans, Intel, R+D, Procurement,

State - White House - DOD

9) Safety, Control, Stability; Permissive Link

ASW

capability for para recon.

Dec. 14:

X Paper on MM; see Hoag (when can they be heard?)

2) Call Hill, Savage

X See memo to Hoge, talk to Hoge. (Bowie, Wolfe, Dixon)

X Kaig? 27 Dec, 9

5) Xmas stuffing?

6) Letters / bills

7) Get Dutt

8) Get ticket to Mich.

X Water travel expenses!

Lifton, Kranish, Wolfe (Dix, Bowie) on

Bhabha on missiles

Sillagan on WWII

(Cohen seminar on A-bomb, H-bomb, N-bomb)

Paul Hammond

Klein, Marshall, Cohen, (Jones) (Hoffman) (

Katz, Digby (Sillagan, de Neufville) Belzer, Hoag (Lifton) (Austin)

AJW
[illegible] for peace recon.

capability for photo recon.]

K: "SU has no need to achieve its objectives by means of war, or by military means."

But: "SU has no need to deploy missiles outside its borders."

(2)

Reuther: in last quarter of 1961, SU produced more steel than US, for the first time (US was producing at 50% of capacity).

[Calculate current capability in US for Type III Deterrence; for expansion of aid; for buildup of conventional capability]

Reuther: Only if, by economic competition, we can overtake the non-military sector of SU can we hope pressure on SU to reduce its military spending, to divert resources to non-military sector.

UN Regional Universities.

17 Dec.

Rentler: Guided Missiles and Misguided Men

[Title for article on Cuba: Suddenly Last Autumn]

[Predict cost of crises, cost of small wars (cost of exercises, maneuvers). Look at costs incurred (by components) in Lebanon, Thailand, Quemoy, Cuba; estimate for given scenarios. Compare to costs of measures to reduce prob. of crises, wars: info systems, C&C, posture, Cost of WW II, Korea. Counter-guerrilla.

Costs of forces expended, transport, stocks, etc.; value ~~costs~~ of capital destroyed;

[Calculate: value of photos of Cuban missiles — in convincing Allies, public, US decision-makers, reducing disagreement: as offset to other forms of intelligence. Contrast to cost of operations. Consider gaps in capability for photo recon.]

Reuther:

K's confidence is based on his belief that our form of society can meet the challenges of peace. He knows that we can unite and act effectively in time of war; but doesn't think our factions can coordinate effectively in time of low tension.

[How much is K counting on the advantages of dealing with an alliance? e.g., was this a major factor in SU's move into Cuba: was there big surprise, Allied reaction? Or perhaps: US move decisive + firm + fast enough to win Allied respect and followership? Improved US crisis machinery may be the way to avoid the weakness of ~~crisis~~ allied policy. Formulate the Allied responses, Alliance propensities, that threaten Allied cohesion and effectiveness in a crisis; prepare planned US responses, institutional changes to forestall Allied dissolution or paralysis or surrender].

[For crises: Plan + prepare for uncertainty, ignorance, mistakes, and different opinions, differences in beliefs, info and goals within US gov, and within Western Alliance.]

[Political "responsible" decision-maker must evaluate a component of national strategy for which he is responsible not in the context of a system optimized as a whole, with other components adapted to this one, but in the context of the probable states of other components. This requires him to know the current and ~~But this~~ likely (or possible, within given period or by certain methods): one of the virtues of "responsibility."

But a cost of "responsibility" is that he has little time to explore — and may even be prohibited from exploring — the consequences or desirability of changes in other components for which he is not "responsible." Thus, there is tendency to identify the "probable" or "assumed" states of other parts of the system as the current states (partly from ignorance, organizational caution, lack of time for contingency planning).

Thus, where "academic" evaluates counterforce as if NATO had adequate conventional capability, "responsible" bureaucrat may tend to evaluate counterforce as if current inadequacies could never or would never change.

Ruth Adams: 19 Dec.

Ajland left the country for Geneva (with his wife) on 24 Oct., Wednesday, as blockade started.

He was convinced:

a) SU would never put missiles in Cuba

b) US was trumping up evidence, trying to provoke SU response.

c) US was planning to strike first.

[Note: can't say this would have been the worst way to go first: SU was not alert, perhaps deliberately so. Nor was NATO]

d) Thus, prob of war (US first strike) was about 90%.

[Note: Geneva was not so dumb under the assumption of a US first strike.]

Domer Jack, 18 Dec. Thought prob of war was very high, though not 90%.

McNaughton: Devolution of authority from Pres is carefully preserved.

"No" order must come from the highest authority.

But:

"Getting them fastest, with the mostest" is absolute.

Getting them too soon, with too much, may run directly counter to the national interest.

DE.

1. No Stop message prepositioned or authorized or potentially authenticated with bombers on airborne alert or Positive Control, for use after they have received a Go order (i.e., on the ground, or in the air after receiving a "Launch" order launching them on airborne alert or Positive Control).

Thus, in case SU surrenders between initiation of US attack and arrival of bombers (e.g., after US missile arrival) — which might be 10-14 hours for most bombers — there is no way even to delay (or divert, retarget, or postpone or cancel) the major part, or any, of the bomber attack on the SU.

Solution: a) ~~Can~~ Put a "Cancel" message, code, in the Positive Control envelope, along with "Go" code. Study and develop procedures for re-directing bombers after they have received a "Go" order.

2. Have procedures relating to Execute messages, Positive Control, weapon safety, unauthorized action in planes, missiles and Command Posts, been studied in the Pacific Command as carefully and comprehensively as in NATO, CONAD and SAC?

Two years ago, the answer was strongly; No.

Procedures differed from one subordinate or ~~[illegible]~~ component command to the next; some were much less reliable than others. In general, the procedures affecting the young, junior officers flying F-100's alone were not nearly as careful as those relating to SAC bomber crews. E.g., they did not, like SAC, receive regular briefings on Positive Control procedures and sign statement that they understood (interviews showed dangerous uncertainties). Nor did they have an "irreversible code", such as recently developed for SAC

"Revolution of rising expectations" → "revolution of rising demands" (willingness to die, beg, riot, threaten, force, to improve lot); Underdeveloped nations have problems that PROBLEMS they didn't "have" (recognize as problems) before.

"It's not my problem" ("That's a real problem; I'm glad it's not mine.")

a) Concentration responsibility for sub-problems is one criterion ("That's his problem").

b) Or: refusal for bargaining purposes to "recognize" certain problems: force effort to "solve" (Game of "chicken").

c) Lack of alternatives or inability to pursue "problem-solving process" because of lack of time.

[Good: "This method is to be used only on problems that are unimportant or urgent."]

("I can't worry about that problem").

Issue: ~~Can~~ Is there a sufficient prob that I can achieve an acceptable solution (or, sufficiently better solution)

Foster:

In Cuba: don't underestimate importance of availability of landing craft.

["Is it 'good' for SU to acquire bigger second-strike capability?] If deterrence should then fail, damage would be lighter.

[Also, less deterrence of lesser-but-large SU 'provocations'. Alternative deterrents are possible, preferable, desirable: but they don't adequately exist today; and it would be irresponsible for US Pres to act in every respect and in every context as if they did exist. Those who would urge him to do so — e.g. by adopting no-first-use-of-nuclears policy — often ignore such consequences as the effect on NATO nations, incentives to develop independent national deterrents (which will not substitute either for conventional arms — to deter small aggression — nor for the US guarantee of first strike — to deter large aggression]

Foster: SC broke mountain a year ago; "We are objective enough to realize that history might not repeat itself; but we do require more assurance than a New Year's resolution."

What is a "lie"? (as in were K's minister claims 'lies'?)

Element of intent, consciousness.

Issue: what is the "claim" to be evaluated?

What were words? Context? Audience(s)?

Consider prisoner of war, who makes a statement that he intends (hopes) to be interpreted in a particular way by an audience that has special knowledge (e.g. of his background, setting, goals, usage), though it would be interpreted differently (in a way such that it would be false) by other, uninformed, "typical" audiences.

To what extent is the proposition a matter of fact, susceptible of being demonstrated to be "true" or "false?"

["In war, truth is the first casualty."]

Danger of relying on "explicit analysis"

of "replacing man by machine" (program)
(bureaucracy, formal)

that system will then be able to do only
what we (designers) know how to explain to do
know how to teach, analytically + systematically

knows, diminishes importance of what we know

Industrialization of President:

not just responsibility, complexity, uncertainty, expense.

but: Mysteries: natural
knowledge
practices
threats } previously hidden, guarded

(What President has previously had? Ike? Had Cold War returned?)

"Political scientists" are prevented from knowing how the systems operates, now — or in the past, since the secret is well kept (better than they can imagine — so they don't know extent of their ignorance, so they compare what they 'know' now with what they 'learn' about the past).

Difficulty of learning from "experts," or from "the uninitiated" (uncleared): (from someone "different").

What they don't know, condemns them.
disqualifies them

Psychologists, econs: psychoanalysts; social scientists...

(Physical scientists, known to know "the secrets of the atom" (but they did back got benefit of the doubt. The bomb worked. True Believers, they).

[To learn, or listen to, someone who doesn't know what we know, diminishes importance of what we know

Jeremy Stone
Hudson Institute
Harmon-on-Hudson, N.Y.

914
RO-2-0700 (Westchester County)

Harold Kuhn
Dept of Mathematics
Princeton University
Princeton, N.J.

11 Aug 64

Interim Report 15 July 64

① [Big] studying difference between war games and reality

Big stable factors as notebooks.

In real crises:

1) Command breaks at of normal channels.

2) Effects of fear, threat, (responsibility; publicity) on decisions

real crises that.

[3. Surprise

4. Commitment, frustration, warnings. error

5 Political opposition, critics

6. Internal resistance { bureau competitation high: limit rigidity

Lec. II

2. "History that is pertinent to the problems of the operation."

Focus on mechanism and processes rather than outcome

Come; in the form in which events presented themselves

to those in line of command responsibility; with all the

confusions, blind alleys, unknowns, ambiguities presented

Normal history is not only not helpful, but is dangerously misleading. Great

Based on the <u>known</u> for and <u>infinite</u> complexity,
ambiguity, ...

[Commonest Events:

1. Where advice, given they really trust and desire.
2. Where or when they have to allocate listening time freely. Ex Communication.
3. Desire to work in privacy, by place or face to face.

[Why finally was it important to see K-C letters?]

[Was "communication" a real problem in Cuban crisis; was problem one of explaining or convincing of K's understanding or his belief?]

[Was it useful to possess caution to K, as distinct from giving cautions?] (Should rather to rationalize caution in us).

/1

How would Johnston know of Pres participation?

SG?

Role of SI?
Diplomatic with USSR, ...

"no record of the issue rising above the level of Sec Def and Under Sec State." CC

Why did Brown back Sawyer, instead of Phoumi?
Where were French?

Why State explosion in neutralist attitude?

Forces needed; as many in charge of forces had to be supported; but he in conflict with men State wanted to support ...
(Jesus sick of "good guys")






Bundy

1. Cuba: DEFCON 3 message sent out in clear, 5 hours ahead of speech — to go to 3 at time of speech. Are EAP geared to US weapons, rather than to US-initiated actions? KO92, 22 Oct

[Bundy's message, TSX to CINCS, criticized as departure from procedures, too limited in dist. But...!]

(Johnston also critiqued!)

2. Cuban Planning Group rule (2 Oct?)
Johnson Task Force

3. Why did JCS meet in Gold Room instead of NMCC?

4. Real possibility of operating from alternate site? Problems?

5. Possibility of a) SOPs for crisis ops
b) "Panels" of cleared people.

6. Are there really, crisis EAPs? Plans for messages, rationing?

20 Oct Fighting began between Chinese + Indian troops

22-23 Oct Yemeni aircraft attacked Aden territory
end Oct: presence of Egyptian troops on Yemen admitted.
3 Nov first shipment of US arms to India arrived.

7 Effect of using SSO channels for communication!

Studies lost; message traffic, J-3, son files & interviews

Lack of access of WSEG studies:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. White House | meetings | telecons |
| 2. JCS | memos | informal meetings |
| 3. NSC | agenda | EO cables |
| 4. SG | letters | Pres – foreign letters |
| 5. USIB | drafts | Dip. contacts; memcons |
| 6. COMOR, etc. | working papers | Dip |
| 7. OSD | NSAMs | |
| 8. State | SNIEs? | |
| 9. CIA DDI DDP | CIA INR memos | |
| 10. Diplomatic; Conferences | Conference minutes | |
| 11. Arms control. | ONE, OIA, INR | |

12. SI; and traffic over SSO channels.

13. T, K; COMOR, SG opts.

14. All source Intl. bulletins

NSC 5? . Staff-type view

The important measures of

1. Pres role

2. Possible Pres ; org 96, etc.

3. Info available to Pres Estimates, SI, T, K, CIB, CL

Diff, letters, telecons

4. Political motives, considerations (e.g. election campaign)

5. Pressures, risks, pressure

6. Personal factors.

7. Pres's problem by duty division nature; Pres, etc.

8. Critical influence of subordinate person processes.

9. current ops process

(510; NSC Operations are now visible.)

In Laos:

b. ~~[illegible]~~ Dec 1960, the Laos were supporting the "legal" govt of Laos, and we were secretly supporting a rebel move to. When we took over, we couldn't get Allies (except Thai, Phil, SVN and China) to recognize it!

Why weren't Laos more active? Where were the forces?

Dec. 13 — Laos received US — secretly — of military from Geneva

Lists reasons for countries.

Role of CAS, CAT, Air Force, Thai, B-26s, T-28s,

Action of Lang Ia — CAS favorite — similar to

action of SVN special troops vs. Buddhists, when Nhu?

How did Election campaign influence?

Description of Allies? (their knowledge of coup?)

Any surprises?

Attitude of Mansfield

What to Front, British gov is future of coalition

with pro-Communist in it?

Phoui confusted? if worry to run a separate Southern Laos?

Had been studying the Geneva Accords

Independent Constitution, etc

Leaders might prefer 3-way split of country.

"Attack" by "VN-Chinese" according to RLG, and

accepted by world press had to be countered

by US (Rawlings) — (war of phony?) just as

Tonkin Gulf "incidents" had to be countered, to save

US prestige.

Parallels: RLG claims of VN, US

Turley claims of flights to Japan

Colson claims of Pro missiles

Why didn't we more publicly its support of Cuba?
So
Fear of DRV – PRC intervention?

[Jerbuque? Find out what an estimate would say;
then get one, if not.]

Was there a decision in fall '61 to give DDP major responsibility
for guerrilla ops in Cuba & Laos?
(Nitze, Gilpatric, McNamara)

State – family disillusion, natural moves
DOD – family military
CIA – family covert
?

(begin to suggest, what kind of problem-solving is needed.

So major issues, can risks & mistakes not from data-collection or transmission, e.g., staff work, but from decisions, judgments performance (asking questions, evaluating, planning, preparation & selection, authorizing, asking info-gathering, making statements, interpreting evidence, defining goals) of by individuals at the top.

How improve their performance, their direction? Involving problem-solving how improve this aspect?

Bureaucracy headed by a politician, an outsider with broad responsibilities (not a bureaucrat).

| | |
|---|---|
| ob: responsibility | to pass on info. upon |

Challenge to constitutionality:

1) Schools: process with deconstruction:
(division)
(also here in Org)

Acts, cases not given; people not given (unlike actual Org).

Depts, c.c. not given (unlike German cases).

2) Central process with deconstruction (Indep: gens.; co-plaints)

Connection:

Violence, constitutes in central, besieged, institution

(Org, Cities, (U.S.), Indian Tribe, (Hyatt))

Ignorance as an issue

3) Org – not from (for Hyatt, a wolf).
here, but complex

(Internal costs of adapting, coping, leading, learning.

Factor in surprise – mandarins
+ lack of orientation

Effects of decision process on responsibility
+ on rewarding strategic goals, etc.

Sol: responsibility to press in info. uform

Causes of High Cost

Cost of the Health of the Building

Cost of [illegible] Decision making

Common Sections (Fly [illegible] & [illegible])

5)

Examination

Inspects minor changes

Short Visiting

Complexity of Common

Common - Value

Reduction & Description — Values

By same reference

Study

area

Power: 402-294X-4111

Col. A.A. Anderson

credit card
986-6297Z H15

If our cause, it likely to have out of a crisis.
List of Tests: our Tests, our Politics,
our Press and Pressure are largely home i
crisis.

Thus, situation the quality of decision-making
in crisis
& control, & management of crisis

[Crisis management: ruling - management of a "
crisis?]

Management of: messages, and actions - messages
te: decisions, tech. knowledge & Mont
by: the President, & his Trusted, Close advisors
Time, Difference - of deployments, Te.
normally,

Also: a cognitive problem: a lack of prior, informed
informed;
a political problem: a failure of a Test.

Ritual.

Crisis as Trauma. as Tests.

Crisis as Surprise. Surprise → [illegible] →
[illegible] → [illegible]
Bringing [illegible] of [illegible] self. [illegible]

Crisis as Dialog. Multi-[illegible] Dialog of [illegible].
[illegible]
Direction, [illegible] Equivocal. Multi-[illegible].
Dialog of [illegible] of [illegible].
Crisis as Limit. Confusion. [illegible]

Crisis as [illegible] of the Providency. Pro life; Pro
nature; Pro [illegible].

Internal [illegible]. Internal conflict. Broken [illegible].
Indecisiveness. 1) Control Theory
2) Pro Dilemma Con Theory
3) Decision Theory
4) Me Theory. (Pro [illegible] Inconsistency)

[ Activity :

Distinction between threat and actual performance of guilty act.

A ⇒ B

1) B (or C) can make B feel guilty for making threats against A — or even failing to comply with A's wishes.

2) B will (when free of guilt) admit to a "socialization/education/legislation" process that will bring the guilt feeling instead of (symbol/power relation controlled by) A (or C): in case he should disobey or threaten B.

3) As consequence of 1 & 2 : A can create compliance for C but, B "cannot" create compliance for A

Also - result of great disparity in power.

A STUVWXYZ
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQR

Examination as potability of a feedback process.

a control system whose output is a Disturbance (or input? longer in environment?) (example coupled structure?) to another Control System.

Together, we have a joint Conflict System whose stability (esp. to third party, or domestic, or humanitarian pressures of "disturbance") is

Col Morgan, ESD Division Chief

Crisis Management

Crisis Manager

Crisis

2 times - Lack of Money

Lack Need to forecast Crisis — To anticipate — To answer

unasked questions

Write

Get Other guidance from Principals:

a) Not True

b) Primary

c) False

---

Work on the social sciences contribute to understanding

— understanding of your behavior — mixing with human

components

— Behavior in crisis

Know Thyself ; Be yourself as other see you

Most cross the plain at high noon;
the infantry on both sides have stuffed
inside; the citizen watch passively; the
blind shelters; the two leaders ~~[illegible]~~ and
the more forward in confusion down a
narrow, deserted street.

I

Tableau vivant. An open line strikingly recruits.
The quality of men [illegible] the NG & Army: the [illegible] is already
the defeating effort long to organize the
rule of the Revolution; carrying out of policies,
any command will the participation of Pres, he
finds in [illegible], [illegible] Tom: he must choose
the small fraction of USG officers.

But in crisis, the Pres. cannot command.
Tableau of Crisis. Class management is required —
coordinated fast action — commander needed.
Policies must be changed (or dangers considered);
crisis must be weighed — Tom, digitus determined,
workers action prepared + considered —

Pres as guardian of the Pres: by authority, by reputation, by range and depth of responsibility. He will want his judgment to be controlling ...

Pres as crisis manager. Pres can manage it for him. But widening time. Constitution:

Spirit of everything we have done in crisis, Pres sign; in particular, in "denial" of the time, fighting, characteristics of crises, we delete into belief of one human responsibility to control, to judge, work — guided, in real situation, who that, often surprise, without plan, ...

If war comes, it will come out of a crisis -- which is a result of a crisis. If "poor" decision-making in a crisis, situations of urgent need, time in which really without action immediate situation

How to avoid wars.

How to prepare for them.

How to conduct them. ("Internal warfare")

How to act wisely in mighty world-day crises.

Human defects in an adequate understanding of civic phenomena. How are decisions made by the citizens; how are citizens motivated to, what do the choices of different nations interact, under what conditions does this interaction lie quiet, which does it explode?

Find the social sciences not to have been [illegible] understanding; [illegible] understanding of behavior; understanding & prediction of individual choices. [illegible]

But War is an object of academic study; the Cold War-decision-making is a [illegible] matter; it is at the heart of several layers of ignorance; it is a matter with a riddle inside an enigma. The outer hardness is the pressure of the interaction of

Numerous large forces acting upon us. They are complex & extraneous ways; & one of these, we have to be a "Black Box", whose inner structure & processes are concealed from us. Our ex. is the result.

That is a mistake. The inner structure is the structure of our own consciousness — observable in natural science, making in the last generation of Galileo, Newton, & Lavoisier possible conversion of [illegible] challenge & innovation. It is in not the Black Box PROCESS OF PROCESS;

And the heart of structure is the structure of the Paradigm — defines the fact, tools & [illegible]

2) Reality

Force in Black Box. Only fact of effect, only fact of effect; insert, nothing of process.

Contention of these positions differs.

Our cause behavior is more than the mere gross behavior & individual people, great people (Hegel, either my document); O.E.

Powers of [illegible]

But specifies [illegible] usually hidden from the "inside" [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Result: a) Non-fulfilment of his orbidy intents by itself; non-[illegible] [illegible]

b) Non-fulfilment of by-[illegible] & factors of [illegible] difficulty of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

~~Hence~~ c) Power fulfilment of any fulfilment

Hence, inward [illegible] [illegible]

a) [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

b) (If [illegible] [illegible] [illegible])

b) [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

c) [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Effects of nursing:

(a) Need for normal activities ]

b) Need for staff follow-through

c) Need for staff understanding of anticipation of Pt's grief behavior; fear, fleeing, preparation

C Prof. of info. What is its Pt's needs?

Need of learning basics. "Crisis basics.

Diagn. & Mg basics. (& bottom-up & Mg Progress)

Staff problem is to prepare answers to (unasked, anticipated) questions;

Early questions are (the) information. ]

d) Need of feedback from (staff +) third parties (Clergy, bereaved)

e) Need understanding by affiliates, allies, staff, others

f) Need prediction of affiliate/ally reactions, behavior (then assign designated, late bereaved party on staff to Pt's case that staff doesn't see ]

implications for social scientists:

1) Bias can be eliminated — can reduced not

but: 2) Its effects on the better understood

3) Bad effects can be reduced, less serious

4) Some intuitive judgments based on

available, more closer for hypotheses.

5) Low variables can by price of access.

6) Often can study, in the sensitive settings,

sensitive behaviors, urgent, high level decision making

in large organizations.

X Com Dilemma

a) Actual limits

b) Fairness

c) Stuffy, middle bounds int, ext.

Was there a question of being something? A crisis? Planning? Why not? What if SAC, or similar, had one set of the blue without fission bombs, or testing? Who knew the line; and why?

Pilots: over and over again it made fools of ground observers by proving their reports inaccurate or wrong.

Two tactical mistakes, the war's attracting features:
1) respect or wishful misestimation of evidence because it does not support a preconceived hypothesis
2) breaking problem into avg (not seeing hypotheses, giving weight of evidence, giving opinion?)

(There was a strong alternative hypothesis — past experience, + produce, both suggested a stopping-place to the military pressure — though not necessarily absence of Il-28's or FROGs, troops; but made their contingent on 500 est of which there would provoke a US military action.) [Would they? They were in combat — which did not specify military action. Were Il-28's, SAMs a test? Lyndon did show sensitivity to SAMs — tolerance, beyond effect — which might have been wrong: but we did nothing, as the defensive formula.

Phraseology

1. Left open possibility that SU would send weapons represented to be defensive in purpose but of a nature "offensive" character.

[Bargaining that they might use words this way meant to say that the words they were using did not constitute a clear commitment.

Why didn't you ask? Soon. Because they didn't believe there was a real issue.

Missiles & other words indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-SU relations than the USSR has displayed thus far....

[Depends on the sense of risk the Soviets attributed: i.e. their estimate of JFK's crisis behavior; our est. assumes they would see risk high: this is a prediction.

Great Power Deception

Hard to conceal from great power; easier to deceive, mislead

— about timing, precise target, purpose

(which affects other actions taken or avoided simultaneously or subsequently, actions of others supported or opposed)

Why deceive? If it is necessary, that suggests the existence of major cross cutters

Call on Report to FIB:

a) "McC is just fortuitously suspicious?

b) McC was always far more alert — everywhere.

(Argued on Oct 4 — had no real evidence of malice).

c) Extraordinary special pains on area intell.

Not effected

d) Comm. on Overland Recon had practice of determining on quota & allocation of flights for month, then at meeting to consider next month. Till this quota had been flown — even though that rate of flights might run into the next month, because of bad weather.

On 10 Oct, they set quota which TR — because of weather contraints set — was not completed till flight of Oct 7. Then it was directed to finding extent of CAH; then already found were not flown over again.

The limitations of MCMs available after mid-Oct were not used to the main place for investigation even covering Cuba? Although suspicions were included on flight Nov. Oct 10 (ready to attack Oct 4 was earlier.)

Issues: 1) Committee on Overland Route: C.H.

2) Meetings of Executive Committee from Oct. 19 to Sept. (Milgrandes?) State

3) Employees, special: State

4) SNR Oct. 19

5) Final draft of Pres. Speech, night of Oct 19

6) Macmillan letter & JFK 22 Oct. State

7) Missions: Delegation – Thompson X ?

– Jones X

Cables (Oct 13, 24, 63) State



One reads 1/2 minute, warning US would not tilt[illegible]

15. The sound of [illegible] heard the night of 19 Oct?

[Oct 19 [illegible] at of 7 days to Japan in tilt, + 7 [illegible] for invasion]

[Did [illegible] analysis of effects of mines?]

[What if Oct 2 had been shot down? What bearing for this, Oct 16–25? What was used from Pearl Harbor to shot? How then was message to Oct 16–22, of flight thought to be?

10. What discussion, Tuesday morning Oct 16?

Who did Dr Tolle talk to between 9 and 11:45?

Evening: 6:30 meeting? Who? Who in the Nat'l meeting,

11? What happened?

11. Who led "mistake" notion? Cindy

12. What were early attitudes of Epsom to the

remaining purposes of operation? SC direction? SC

expectations? Relative to politics, the Election?

13. What telephone behavior appeared early: e.g. intell

comm, Tower failure?

[22 Oct: [illegible] VC [illegible] 1st W Sent

Who was told Oct 14 — why? Who told him — why?
Who was not told, who was told was Brooklyn?
Who was left out Thursday?
When, during evening?

Little was in by reason of timing, process?
Flows?

Did we are besides McG want to talk to Pers? Did they know he didn't know?

What were their first reactions — Oct 15? What did they do? What did they tell? Pay anything, prior to Commanding?

Did 1-2 fly on Oct 16? Might Pers have relieved the 3 Oct 15?

20, 29, 25, Gym — 20, 28, 26

[What other advantageous moves for SU are being regarded as unlikely because "too risky" in [illegible] of other pressures underlying Cuban situation?]

3. Where info on Committee on Soviet Bases? When rec'd? What was our planning in case of incident? Was ops would be coordinated — special care to avoid incidents when an inspected operation is going on?

4. Was flight 10 only scheduled because of Sept. deadline? Was flight cancelled? Other months considered?

5. When did pressure build for invest. of MRBM sites? (MCs scheduled?)

1. When was last CC intercept or Pots interpretation?

2. Was was sys. in 1958 relevant to folks?

[Was it important to the decision of 15-22 Oct that special meeting was started already to affirm sys. in Cuba — because of political considerations?

— Sat 21 Oct 12-2.

[Question for Sorensen: What was the effect on US decision-making of: surprise, deception, fait accompli?

How could K have reduced his risks? Reduced rewards? What would have been effects of telling Fac? Suppose Fac had known of missiles the day of inspection in SU? What would K have done?]

Crisis, Decision + Response

I am emphasizing emotion as an effect and a cause; this introduces consideration ignored in the "decision" approach, which does not ask Why the alternatives, contingencies, values are seen as they are, or how/why they change.

The emotional response is not, altogether, chosen deliberately (though it may be channelled; + the extent to which it is revealed or explained may be controlled)

and it in turn affects response variables in some ways "uncontrolled by the ego" — i.e. not chosen — not adapted to conscious goals + expectations of future consequences.

Anger, fear, hatred (from humiliation) anxiety, depression affect values and expectations, shared behavior, alternatives perceived + considered, goals, etc. — in ways not explicit, conscious, or "chosen."

(Anger may also be useful, and be used; it can be deliberately incurred, or be feigned.

Thus, not all effects of the "info that produces emotion"

can be described in terms of Bazerman's Theorem.

Important parts of governmental response are not "chosen" or "decided" by highest officials (though someone may have "decided" them; but of these, important parts may not have been "decided" by anyone.

(e.g. high officials may have determined or specified them — without using a process of "decision.")

Contrast is to the "team" approach — which assumes common (organizational) motives, models (though different evidence and action-responsibilities).

(Quietly, one ~~[illegible]~~ looks for in motions, or splits in goals/values/models between "politically responsible officials" and bureaucrats.

Do Presidents influence gov response — in ways not determined by the bureaucracy, or public, explicit premises defining the "national interest" before the event?

Lincoln challenges "costs of calculation, neard, "Really, the
so limits on "rational planning"

& focus on <u>costs</u> in the form of <u>political</u> costs,
risks, dangers, rather than <u>economic</u> costs.

Costs of calculating, <u>considering</u>, expecting / predicting
foreseeing, "being informed". [e.g. <u>responsibility to
pass on info</u>" of certain kinds, or from certain sources — to
others with different models, goals; time, preference;
some cases for "not being told; not knowing" (of
<u>preparations</u>; or, of info that would be misinterpreted, or would
lead to "bad" referring behaviors, or pressures for action).

Effects of "decision process" on <u>responsibility</u>:
potential challenge, criticism

Ignorance As An Excuse

(e.g. for not informing <u>others</u> — Congress, public,
Allies; not "passing on info.")

Means-ends (vs. actions-consequences-values)

Simon objections ..

But means-ends approach, starting with goal/end (like "problem-solving," a "control" approach) lead indirectly to consideration of search for structures, means; while "decision" approach assumes means given, emphasizes evaluation of them, rather than invention, discovery, search.

However, decision approach does suggest a search for goals/values/ends, so as to choose; i.e. as a basis for comparison and choice. Systems analysis.

Whereas means-ends may assume ends given, totally specified in advance, unchanging.

Presidential Role

Alternative first approximations.

1) To mediate disputes, define ends, evaluate ends, and choose policies / programs, without reference or consideration of Administration / party / personal interests.

2) "To increase / maintain power and influence of nation (to achieve general goals or clearly defined elsewhere: bureaucracy, public, Congress, pressure groups, party)

2) to maintain his Administration in office (satisfying) (and his own place in history, and his own current prestige and influence).

Internal War ed Harry Eckstein Free Press 64

Political Power US/USSR Brzezinski + Huntington Viking 64

Rand 3603 H. Montgomery Hyde Farrar-Straus

Korea - The Limited War Daniel Rees St. Martin's, 64

British Politics in the Suez Crisis Univ. Ill. Press Epstein

Fact accomplice and bravery

Motives for bravery:

1) Keep himself from committing himself to courses which he will then have to carry out.

He might have to commit himself of his (& his publics) honour of name — because of prior position, his publicis or allies' attitude. He might be encouraged to do it by belief that we are unlikely to make good threats, esp. (JFK vs. K in Sept. 62), by political benefits of being tough. Sports unlikely contingency, or by (may be trade with warheads, to compensate for reprisals [illegible]), or belief we are highly unlikely to do it given his warning. (Ike vs. English, JFK vs. K; K vs. Blockade in Sept 28, 62?)

Or, he might be obligated to pass info on, if "defensive", "constitutional" or "specific" — to others who would then take countermeasures or press him to take action.

(So, observe his of this responsibility: English-France vs. Hy; K vs. JFK in Sept 62; Eisenhower vs. warning of air strike to K? Eisenhower vs. telling Allies early?)

✓

Naughton speaks on planning

Four reasons for appearance of chaos:

1) Complexity of motives: different sets + weightings at different times, places. (+ different weightings by different people, with different perspectives and obligations).

2) Gov can't discuss freely all motives or info — even within gov.

3. Different motives relating to policy statements: different and multiple audiences, different circumstances.

4. Fact of controversy, difference of opinion, bureaucratic functions, operations.

Neustadt (Thinking in Chaos)

Prior commitments, policies.

Eisenhower & United Nations in the Suez Crisis

1. Eden had been main figure in moving out of Suez in 1954 — against opposition of Suez Group in his own party (And this been remembered by Conts troops moving out in 1956?)

2. Did not Nasser move — right after troops moved out — tends to discredit Eden's policy; vindicate his opposition; specifically, indicating "conciliatory" or "trusting" policy wrong and encouraged "defiance."

3. But competition in general; Britain now helpless to detain from Egypt. It was in this prospect that Eden now stalked some of

b) Cuba
c) Korea ?

4. Eden — like SUE in Cz (Germany — SO, or not?) was complicated of being indecisive and insufficiently dedicated to the goals sought by intervention.

5. The "humiliation" was seen as an opportunity by the Suez Group: to topple Nasser, restore Suez Canal, reassert

British influence in ME and independence of US, maintain imperial role.

First as Suez was opportunity to invade Eden, Toffee Centre (resisted by JFK); first as Eden finally abandoned his opportunity.)

Cuba — as Suez was opportunity to slight Eisenhower spending policy, reason, is called for by VSC-68.

And as Grand Harbour was opportunity.

4. Thus Eden, like JFK (& Common?), knew that most would have strong support of an aggressive opportunist group (in his party; JFK — in Pentagon); and would measure hawkishness of Eden and leader personally.

(Indeed JFK; Eden hawks of opposing party was opposed, and some doubts of his own.

Thus, "provocation" was many reasons an opportune occasion for an "excuse." (Actually, heads of state wanted war, but Eden more).

d.

5. To have failed to use "opportunity" to move violently — (and impulsively, in long run) would have exposed him — like U.S.K. (Emperor?) to cheap attack; "revealed" indecisiveness & weakness; truth of charges against him.

(Cf. of Page, Edw.)

6. Style & nature of prosecution — which discredited policy of self-willed leader — was seen as effronte, defiance ("impudence") — infuriating, and humiliating, and damaging to prestige and influence in the eyes of third parties.

(Leader really incl. Pr. of Sig — Nantucket)

(Allen: France; or bearing of Trial in Europe:

"Those beastrods! Why can't he stick to one? Truman finally he had been misled — by Byrnes?! or by his intelligence?]

Cuban

1.

7. ~~The~~ Issues of gov: 1) concealing prior knowledge (of Grenada attack); (also allusion, not charged in Order — of being told Grenada by world gov, & would vote ~ 1V.

2) dressing people up to blame, entire.
3) deciding who not consulting Allies.
4) not telling Parliament or all of Cabinet (by of Prop, Cabs; not issue in US?)

(Role of Congress in Iran? Role of Congress?)

[8. Did Eban know of prospective Dulles withdrawal of support of Dam? Evelyn Children, Bad to Long, 161–62, 191 ].

legal.

8. Difference: lack of organized political opposition in the US cases: Cuba I & II, Korea. What might have produced it in US?

Main opposition in US is Democrats, not in Republicans in Cuba. Still, why not more criticism?

9. Question: What were Nasser's expectations? Why did he think he could get away with it? (vs. K & Eden, Wilson).

10 Role of elections. Randolph Churchill, Rise & Fall of Sir Anthony Eden, London 1959, p. 293. Britain thought she could be preoccupied with election, or would want to offending French voters. Thought American opinion would vary from "benevolent neutrality" to "hostile neutrality." (Uncertainty recognized.) Strange thought.

11. Goal of first example: to be seriously committed (by initiation) before US or Soviet (Khrushchev / Party / rulers) opposition could see need or opportunity to commit itself, to take move; or oppose strongly.

(Fait accompli vs. giving first move: first commitment: and, against internal + local opposition).

first it didn't get "credit" for being committed + opposition (US; Kahn; JFK + Cabs) acted despite considerable commitment by initiation: + first because they feel committed themselves earlier, and open move without courtesy + warning looked like defiance of their officered desire.

12. Phenomenon: refusal of Sov to allow Cuban to cause force — forcing it to withdraw before Cuban demand (+ rather, to stop before attack succeeded — instead of risking successful attack is better than US wounded failure — even if worse than no attack).

[On changes of Individuality:
When my cradle

[illegible]

[illegible] on legitimacy [illegible]: Secrecy is demanded by the Allied governments, because of their anticipation of the reaction of their government's publics

(particularly in the face of enemy protests, incidents.)

Thus, Indian gov. flights over Himalayan passes.

Norwegian gov. said [illegible] of nature of flights, contrary to what Stettinius told Congress.

(Note: they proposed to be open to charge of not knowing, than to charge of knowing.

[Wright Carter have claimed lack of knowledge.]

Distrib. 18 l.pts: Late of ofc 7 l.pt, acquired 15 l.pt

resident of Havana (F) with good contacts among high level officials in the railroad industry.

eval. perm: (4) 2: 3

1. A large zone in Pinar del Rio province within a hinterland held by the troops.

(NB comm. It is doubtful that ground forces could effectively control as an exploitable area a zone as large as the one cited above.)

2. Plantation grounds; coastal activity; small & lake minded.

Cornell: given the box, it took high level attention to get outside of normal fabrication bounds to get anything beyond up the line.

[Does review analysts to pass on the info, if not, e.g. in the Cuban Daily Summary — read carefully in DCI's office. ?]

(Ensigna concerns of need to be able to explain, if there was a mishap, the first question for the flight in terms of highest priority needs.

Recorded reports (Hanna) received by analysts 24 Sept, based upon Cuban 27 Sept. Sept, 1 Oct, away.

report C-3
1 Oct, report from., analyst looked at Nov 9 or 10 Sept.

Then triggered targeting process. Target selected was that national in report of 8 Sept; not much attention had been paid to it at time, partly because DIP evaluation of report paragraph reporting based area was 4. (source: E)

But, with other three reports...




MAC noted we could have gotten it maybe a week or ten days earlier, but Carroll replied, would what you could have gotten a week or ten days earlier have been enough to convince anybody — look at the trouble we had convincing people with what we got on the 14th.

Nixon could be felt this had been an illegal victory

Would we have got nothing to be ashamed of even if we do have a SINE we won't hang. This report first doesn't let us put our best foot forward.

Bottom line, we don't put unique reports in the Checklist or the CIB.

MI-62559 Call to G
9/70 Chronicle

[Was a Soviet overflight plan instituted?
Were high-level assurances relayed for White House?
available to CIA?]

Allen: The whole group was fearful of another U-2 incident in early October. Everybody was reluctant to see another boy get shot down, but also was anxious to avoid jeopardizing the approval to fly U-2s, which might well have happened on the heels of a public uproar. Carter also stressed how difficult it had been to obtain approval of the U-2s from Taylor, and through him, from the President. Also, there were plans to use U-2s in the Far East, which would need approval.

[Oh, people at lower levels had made to be cautious
Thereafter, but they had the approval at higher levels.]

4 Oct DCI at SG [Aug?] passed for in wrong of western Cuba, charged that CIA was being restricted to the subsonic only. The AG was quite provoked and claimed that there had been no requirements submitted for the western end, and that at no time had the Pres or the SG turned down any flights CIA asked for. It is that it was here that the DCI's sensitivity to overburdening the fear of SAMs was born.

A flight plan approved on 9th. This flight was intended to discover if the SAMs were functional. The flight plan was laid out to cover the two most alarmed if these were not functional, then they would go for through coverage of western Cuba island for on the next mission. The Pres. stayed the Oct 14 mission but withheld approval for the next mission until the results of the 14th. were known.

The S&C pilot, new to the area, got lost and was wounded and only by resident overflew the Sen Cristobal area. He was seen to lose some distance & the crate of which he should have been when he overflew the MRBMs.

29 Sept: Wet good. Flight cancelled for NE penetrating flow weather; other flown over Isle of Pines.

7 Oct. All Clear – good: flight over NE penetrating.
Completed 1st mission; 2nd mission not yet authorized. 8–11 Oct: Weather not checked
[Any question?]

29 Sept no weather check (?).
31 Aug – 4 Sept " " " (No 1st mission yet authorized)

W: On 10 Sept on ad hoc basis by the SG & Bundy's office drew a flight plan for a single mission to cover the bulk of what CONOC asked on 5 Sept. Subsequently, found that the single mission into 4 Pens, 4 enemy bases had to be flown. Consolidated the flg all together & airplanes sent staff.

Weather said to be generally good (0-4 over at time of the — no fog decision, ½ hours before takeoff

Five scheduled missions cancelled because of poor (3/3 - ½ over) & bad weather over areas of desired coverage: Sept 7, 17, 22, 23, Oct 2; one on Sept 17 found targets (Pelar of Pins) obscured.

[~~Effectively~~ Standdown for lack of flight over China on 8 Sept till 16 Sept]

Between 16 Sept and 14 Oct, weather poor to bad over targets for at least 18 of the 32 days.

Best stretch unflight conditions between 16 - 24 Oct (some of best weather over Shanghai & Pelar).

Sept 7 planned for southern Pelar; cancelled for poor weather.

16-17 Sept: West-good; central + East poor. Flight aborted; delayed by poor weather over targets in Eastern China. Cancelled 17 Sept.

24 Sept: West - good, East - good, Central - poor. Flight over SE - Pelar, Canc.

27 Sept West good; 29.

The sensitivity attributed, often only softly, to the presence of offensive weapons systems in Cuba had the effect of requiring a higher grade of proof in order to demonstrate to policy makers that a major qualitative change had taken place in the Soviet arms build-up.

[Who wrote this? Evidence?]

[Higher than would have been necessary, say, on Aug 25?]

The numerous reports of offensive missile activity for a long period prior to the beginning of the arms build-up, some of which had been substantiated and many of which had been disproved, increased skepticism among intelligence analysts of subsequent reports of such missiles, especially in lieu of photo reconnaissance.

[ie reports were taken less seriously so evidence then if of those had not many credible reports & only (6) as credible opportunity to check + disprove reports by photos.

Tentative Conclusions of Interim Report

- Int. comm's consistent timely awareness of the offensive threat was reflected by the absence of requirements specifically targeted against the pretender threat (except for 3 Oct targeting, 14 Oct mission)...

- SI gave intell on ship movements & development of an hypothesis, but did not address to disclose Jap intentions [role of SI?] or action in deploying missiles.

(Likewise: ship photos (except 11-22); agent reports including displacements of friendly nations, intell from coverage of PI (except 11-23 training).

Bot: refugees; reports (about 200 over 6 mths); photos — though program not planned with adequate vision during development period of Jap build-up to provide coverage of all parts of the island with sufficient frequency.

Stern Report: first major equipment associated with
Jupiter missile arrived Oct. 6 Sept,
first IRBM unit moved to site Oct
17 Sept.

Pictures of U-2 crash of 23 Sept took 12 days to
reach Washington. Uncovered U-2 prints seen in Lab
15 Oct. IRBM site 15 Oct.

West end of Cuba not photographed between 29 Aug
and 14 Oct. (6 weeks!)

And Cuba happened to build from west to east.

[Perhaps clouds had covered west end of
island on 29 Aug + 5 Sept. Then west + central
SAMs would have been seen first, attention turned
to west. Then, if flight had been delayed till,
say, 20 Sept (Was more weather on west end
in Sept?) we might have seen IRBMs — perhaps
before experts!]

(But we might have seen SAMs till 10-20 Sept
in west.]

Procedures adopted in Sept. delayed pilots until.
but the delay was not critical, because pilots obtained prior to about 17 Oct. [?] would not have been sufficient to warrant action of a type which would require support from Western Hemisphere or NATO Allies.

[Might it have served our justification for a fait accompli?]

14. What kind and [illegible] of equipment for attack? [Y or N?] (Type?)

[50 antiaircraft guns for MRBMs, +100 antiaircraft for airfields, +200 for SAMs. 30% attrition/1000 bombs for inversion.]

[Thought K planned to come to NY, UN late in November after Inverse Missiles; K thought anything at that time would be useful. G intended to make these threats and to allow war only for the purpose of contributing to the defensive capability of Cuba.

JFK: sure that Castro was having a profound impact on American people + Congress. G. mentioned Eg of Cuba. Gen. said in that bill already stated K that was a mistake, and that had he been asked he would have given warnings there would be no further increase. Thought. But since fighting when arms shipments started, situation had changed. G. SAM specialists were going home in the next [illegible] [illegible] rate of defensive arms — and he intended to stay.

18 Oct Joint GMAC-JAEIC-NPIC Evaluation.
MRBMs could be launched within 8 hours.

18 Oct. DCI asked USIB to consider how reaction to
three possible courses of action:
a) To do nothing about offens. missiles
b) Total or limited blockade when belligerent of war
c) Military action to destroy missiles and launch sites.
SNIE 11-18-62 (18-19 Oct).

X

5 Oct
7 Oct } proposed missions

5 Oct: USIB mtg re U-2 flts still first. priority objective on a north

7 Oct SG (Reg)? decided to overfly a SAM site in western Cuba

but to target of 14 Oct.

(5 Oct: "COMOR recognizes increased risk of aircraft in light of the SA-2 and Mig-21 aircraft present there, but it must be stated that the current need is extremely urgent and the risks involved should be very thoroughly weighed before this coverage is denied."

7 Oct: SG (Reg) discussed question of recon. First priority to one U-2 over western end. If no flak, consider routes.

[How close was this decision? What if it had been flak?]

10-12 cancelled. 12 Oct: actual passed to SAG.

15, 16 17 Oct SNIE 11-17-62 drafted

14 Sept: SG considered proposal on Bus. Attitude (for Bus). Noted that PerDig didn't want the considered till results of OA flights available.

[illegible] – 16 Sept: weather checked daily for flight. Cancelled.

17 Sept: flt. over Bus: land cover.

18-21: blocked, cancelled.

22-26: blocked, flown on 26. Bus.

27 Sept: SG planned OA forecasts for one mission in Oct, + any Sept flights not yet flown (4 flights remained when forecast drafted).

29 Sept: Sale of Pins, Big of Pigs.

29-2 Oct: peripheral considered, cancelled.

& mission land cover.

3 Oct: OA mtg to COMOR: request MRBM mes. COMOR thoughts

4 Oct: SG (Aug): DCI said OA instructed to avoid U-2 in SE gradients because of SAMs. The depicted lat gradients believed. DCI questioned.

NRO to present program for all recon to SG (Aug) on 9 Oct.

[1. When was mission planned by CIA originally?
Was it planned for 6 flights, delayed by weather?
" " " " 10 flights " " incidents?
Why was special meeting called for 10 flights? incidents?

2. Fault: lack of foresight by intell. comm. — flights for more flights or coverage of entire area.
Analogy why: [ incidents
failing at multiple SAMs
cancellation on 4 flight time
G.C. cancellation that SAMs could proceed

Because of limited number of flights originally, CIA made it a practice not to fly unless weather over most of critical targets was less than 15% forecast
Poor weather + 4 separate flights ⇒ longer time to get requested photo coverage.
[ B.T.: cuts — no less targets requested. ]

He said that he had no objection to the proposed patrols and, in fact, thought it useful to continue to establish our right to fly over international waters. On the other hand, he recognized the necessity for obtaining vertical coverage of the Isle of Pines and the eastern portion of Cuba at this time. He felt, however, that it is unwise to combine extensive overflying of international waters with actual overflights. He pointed out that the long peripheral flight would draw undue attention to the mission and further that should the aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight had occurred, this would place the US in a very poor position for standing on its rights to overfly international waters.

Taking these views into account, the CIA plans to break the proposed coverage into four parts — the Isle of Pines, the area roughly east of [illegible], and two legs along the coast — one north and one south."

(See Plan proposal of 4 parts.)

8 Sept: COMOR received results.

9 Sept " memo to A/DCI.

Mission didn't cover Isle of Pines (SAMs) or get Cuba possible SSM &
other areas which could be developed
for SAM and possible SSM deployments.
Recommends better mission as soon as weather permits
for targets mentioned above.

D/IAR told COMOR that State had asked whether
Cuba could be covered by peripheral means.
(20 miles out).

10 Sept. COMOR replied: could not satisfy requirements for
Cuba, or search later for SAMs further inland, nor
for better Mig-21 count on island because of
technical intell.

10 Sept. special meeting (of ?) in McG's office after
2 U-2 incidents. Tom Parrott wrote memo: 11 Sept
See State, AG, A/DCI + others, See State expressed
concern at CIA's planned coverage of Cuba, including
extensive peripheral coverage as well as two legs
directly over Cuban airspace, all in one flight.

3 Sept special entry of COMOR in light of 29 Aug results. requirements for next flight agreed. No need for 30 sites with longer to unflight

Because of known SAM sites plus need for localization of Bases; COMOR thought first flight should be brought to attention of acting DCI.

4 Sept: Memo from COMOR to A/DCI entry approved:

"In view of finding SAM sites on eastern end of island, it is particularly important that as soon as weather permits the next authorized mission should cover those areas of the island which were not photographed because of weather or because the range did not permit.

"C. That the coastline at the eastern end of island should be photographed again, but there is no requirement at this time for coverage of the SAM sites.

5 Sept: eastern & central portions of island; land cover in Sept.

2-2 flights begun 26 Oct 60. Till 12 Oct, 62: 54 flights.

After Feb 62, 2/month.

2 extra in June.

12 July: SG (Aug) agreed to extra 2/month.

19 July: NCC proposals 4/month (approved by meeting Washington). Board will approve, through medium of CA Monthly Forecast, flights planned for each succeeding month.

30 July: SG approved 2 for Aug.

5 Aug: results inadequate, cause malfunction; CO 402 requested 2 more flights in Aug

8 Aug flt. cancelled; cancelled for bad weather, op. factors.

9 Aug: SG: second mission when DC1 results necessary. If 3rd mission necessary later in month, should be considered on its merits at that time.

Results: 10 Aug for 12; 17 Aug, daily return 17-24 Aug, when mission cancelled. (weather).

Next mission delayed by weather till 29 Aug.

8 SAM sites.

30 Aug. SG approved forecast for 6 flights for 9 ft.

SNIE 80-62, 17 Jan — Threat to US Security Interests in Carib. Area

SNIE 85-62 — 21 March — Sit & Prospects in Cuba

SNIE 85-2-62 — 1 Aug — " "

SNIE 85-3-62 — 18 Sept — Military Build-up in Cuba.

Estimates dependent on individual: a) over-all Sov policy, including policy w.r.t. US; b) Sov policy w.r.t. Latin America; c) Sov relations with Castro, purposes in Cuba, and the military build-up.

Est. conclusions:

a) Sov policy w.r.t. US: To avoid the risk of confrontation with a high degree of risk of 1) losing Cuba, or (2) going to war.

b) in L.A. & Cuba: policy designed to win victory by other than military means, and this would be jeopardized by strat. base.

c) Military build-up probably compatible with these policies.

7 Sept } (Bonn?)
13 Sept } instructions on publicity offensive weapons discussed in USIB.

(info, after mid-Sept, was included in briefings and memos by DIA for Sec Def and JCS.

(State? But not NSC? Pres?)

10 Oct  IL-28s published. USIB meeting setting up PSALM (Pres under 10 Oct?)

Discussion of new info on offensive stuff limited to USIB principals only.

Retraction

May 62: DCI told analysts to check out with NPIC any reports unsuitable to photo verification.

Mid-August (22 Aug?) DCI briefed Pres on increasing volume of agent-of-origin reports: Pres directed every effort to check out these reports. DCI told DD/I to check every available source, particularly NPIC.

[Then, weather forecasts on photos reflected in indication sports publishing].

Instruction came to be interpreted by CIA analysts as a restriction on publishing anything that could not be verified by NPIC. Except one item on SAMs, nothing unsuitable was published in CIB, Summary or Checklist that had not been so verified.

31 Aug: Pres ordered USC, Stump acting DCI, not to publish results of 29 Aug flight till policy decided (Did this include suspicions on Cuba, or just SAMs? Cuba noticed 5 Sept?]

Cuba published 17 Sept; SAMs after 9 Sept.

Little land evidence of fire deception program:
low "Disinformation" Bureau; must frequently consult OP.

OSB Cardinal Notch Report. fully & formally coordinated.
Illustrates usefully crisis mess.
Taken on agenda 21 Aug; reversed 28 Aug.

Effect of restraints on liaison was to concentrate info at decision making levels of Govt.
[Contrast to normal situation; effects?]
[Was Saigon response hampered by lack of prior planning? Might it have been, if developed differently?]

March 62: CIA Saigon Daily Summary established: direct support to officers responsible for clandestine collection ops. Subject to publishing restrictions.
[Used as source for Pres Checklist?]
[No items in Officers' reports in Checklist; restrictions regarded as flaws]
Saigon Weekly Highlights established on 27 Aug for Special Group (Augmented) to 19 Sept.